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Impaired recognition of emotion after stroke can have important implications for social competency, social participation, and
consequently quality of life. We describe a case of left hemispheric ischemic stroke with impaired recognition of specifically faces
expressing fear.Threemonths later, the patient’s spouse reports that the patient was irritable and slow in communication, whichmay
be caused by the impaired emotion recognition. The case is discussed in relation to the literature concerning emotion recognition
and its neural correlates. Our case supports the notion that emotion recognition, including fear recognition, is regulated by a
network of interconnected brain regions located in both hemispheres. We conclude that impaired emotion recognition is not
uncommon after stroke and can be caused by dysfunction of this emotion-network.
1. Introduction
Social cognition concerns the psychological processes by
which we perceive, process, and interpret social information
[1]. Nowadays, neurologists are increasingly aware of the imp-
ortance of screening for deficits in social cognition [2]. For
example, screening for impaired social cognition has become
more common in patients with traumatic brain injury [2, 3].
After stroke, impaired social cognition isprevalent,witha rep-
orted prevalence rate of 49% [4]. Despite the high prevalence,
deficits in social cognition after stroke are often overlooked by
the neurologist, and it is generally not spontaneously men-
tioned by the patient or his caregiver.
After stroke, impaired social cognition is partly reflected
by worse emotion recognition in studies that compared
patients to healthy controls in tasks examining facial, proso-
dic, and lexical emotional stimuli [5, 6]. These studies show
that impaired emotion recognition after stroke is not limited
to one modality: a stroke affects general processing of emo-
tion for different modalities.
Impaired emotion recognition after stroke has a negative
influence on social participation, and it can have important
implications for a patient’s quality of life [7]. Moreover, it
can affect social competence [8], it predicts social behavior
disorders [9], and it is negatively correlatedwithmaintenance
of personal and professional relations [10, 11].
We present a case with a profound difficulty in the recog-
nition of faces expressing fear after insular stroke. Further-
more, the case is discussed in relation to the literature con-
cerning emotion recognition and its neural correlates.
2. Case Description
A sixty-five-year-old, right-handedman, who had just retired
from his work as a detective, presented with global aphasia,
agitation, and a mild paresis of his right arm, which started
acutely 5 hours before admission. He had no known vascular
risk factors, and he had a degree in higher vocational educa-
tion.The admission CT scan of his brain revealed no signs of
ischemia or hemorrhage. One day after admission, the total
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Table 1: The patient’s results for the “Ekman 60 Faces Test.”
Emotion Nr correct answers Mean scores reference sample (SD) Cutoff values
Anger 8/10 7.33 (1.90) 4
Disgust 6/10 9.00 (1.62) 6
Fear 1/10∗ 6.47 (2.03) 3
Happiness 10/10 9.93 (0.42) 9
Sadness 5/10 8.03 (1.66) 5
Surprise 5/10∗ 8.66 (1.44) 6
Total 35/60∗ 49.41 (4.88) 41
The mean scores, standard deviations. and cutoff values for the reference sample (aged 61–70) are derived from the FEEST manual. This sample consisted of
58 healthy participants with an IQ > 90. Cutoff values have been calculated by using the nearest integer value to a 𝑧-value of 1.65 below average [12]. ∗Scores
below the cutoff value.
Table 2: Neuropsychological assessment of the patient.
Domain 𝑇-score Tests 𝑇-scores
Attention and processing speed 46.6
Reaction Time Test, Vienna Test System, S1, S2 50.5
Symbol Digit Modalities Test 44.2
Trail Making Test A 41.0
(Working) memory and learning 39.2 WAIS Digit Span Forward and Backward 41.7
The Rey Auditory Verbal Learning Test 38.0
Frontal-Executive functions 39.8
Controlled Oral Word Association Test 30.0∗
Hayling Test 40.0
Reaction time test, Vienna Test System, S3 47.0
Trail Making Test B 44.0
Language 31.6∗ Boston Naming Test 23.1
∗
Semantic fluency 40.0
Visuospatial function NA Bells Test, no 𝑇-score available, 1 omission NA
This table shows the 𝑇-scores of the patient for each of the tested domains in the neuropsychological assessment. ∗Scores below 1.5 standard deviations.
score on theMontreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA) was 20
out of a maximum of 30 points, mainly failing the subdo-
mains language (0/3), delayed recall (2/5), and visuospatial
function (2/5). The patient correctly copied the cube and
made no mistake in the contour of the clock. However, he
did not add numbers to the clock and placed the hands
at ten to eleven, instead of ten past eleven. Two days after
admission, the patient did not report any complaints. The
aphasia, paresis, and agitation had resolved quickly, and the
patient was discharged home. As part of an observational
study, the PROCRAS study, see Additional Points for more
information, the patient underwent a detailed neuropsycho-
logical assessment and MRI scan of his brain 4 weeks after
the stroke. Apart from complaining of being tired more
quickly, he had no other complaints at that point. As part
of the neuropsychological assessment, the “Ekman 60 Faces
Test,” part of the Facial Expressions of Emotion: Stimuli and
Tests (FEEST), was performed [12]. Interestingly, out of 10
presented fearful faces, he recognized only 1 facial expression
correctly. For his performance on other emotions, see Table 1.
His total score on the FEESTwas nearly 3 standard deviations
below the norm. There were no symptoms of depression
or anxiety on the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale
(HADS). Moreover, there were no signs of prosopagnosia,
and the Bells Test revealed no visuospatial dysfunction. Fur-
ther extensive neuropsychological testing revealed problems
with naming objects on the Boston Naming Test but no
impaired performance on the verbal fluency test. In Table 2,
the 𝑇-scores for each domain and the subtests that constitute
these domains are presented. The MRI showed a lesion
of the posterior part of the left insula but also of a part
of the left temporal cortex and the left parietal cortex as
can be seen in Figure 1. In order to investigate potential
impairments in brain connectivity, the brain network of the
patient was reconstructed from the diffusion weighted MR
images as described in Reijmer et al. [13].Themean fractional
anisotropy of the white matter tracts connected to each of
the 90 cortical and subcortical brain regions was calculated.
The brain networks of 25 age-matched healthy control par-
ticipants served as a reference group. Results showed that the
connectivity strength of the patient was markedly reduced
(>1.5 SD lower compared to the reference sample) in several
parietal, temporal, and subcortical regions, primarily in the
left hemisphere (Figure 2), indicating disconnection of a
network of brain regions.
Three months after the stroke, the patient felt no restric-
tions in his ability to perform hobbies such as gardening
and reading, and he experienced no difficulties in social
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Figure 1: Transversal fluid attenuated inversion recovery (FLAIR) images of the patient, revealing a lesion to the posterior part of the insula





Figure 2: Axial (a) and lateral (b) view of the disconnectivity profile of the patient (obtained from analyzing the DTI-MRI data). Nodes
represent 90 cortical and subcortical brain regions [38]. The red nodes indicate regions with more than 1.5 standard deviations of decreased
connectivity strength compared to 25 age-matched healthy controls. Note that nodes surrounding the ischemic zone are affected. In addition,
however, nodes in the contralesional hemisphere and a frontal node are affected. This suggests that the stroke affected a network of brain
regions.
contact. However, his wife reported that he has been slower
in communication and manifests slight irritability ever since
the stroke.
3. Discussion
In this article, we present a case with a profound deficit in the
recognition of facial emotions expressing fear after enduring
a stroke of the posterior part of the left insula and parts of
the left temporal and parietal cortex. There was no evidence
of depressive or anxious symptoms on follow-up, suggesting
that the difficulty in recognition of fearful faces was not
caused by a depressive or anxiety disorder. It has not been
ruled out that visuospatial dysfunction caused the impaired
recognition of facial emotions. However, the score of 2/5 for
the MoCA’s visuospatial subdomain might have been caused
by a language disorder rather than a visuospatial disorder.
Moreover, the Bells Test revealed no abnormalities at the
neuropsychological examination 4weeks after stroke,making
a neglect very unlikely. It was not clear whether our patient
had difficulties in emotion recognition before the stroke, for
example, due to an autism spectrum disorder or traumatic
brain injury in the past. However, we think that his higher
education level and his work as a detective require at least
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adequate social cognitive skills. Therefore, it is plausible to
attribute the profound deficit in fear recognition to the stroke.
This case stood out because of two reasons. First, the stroke
involved the left hemisphere, while emotion recognition is
generally attributed to the right hemisphere [5]. Secondly,
the deficit in recognition of fearful faces after ischemia of
the posterior part of the insula seems to contradict earlier
findings in the literature [14–16]. Recognition of fear has been
strongly linked to activity in the amygdala [16], whereas the
insula is thought to be specifically engaged in the recognition
of disgust [14, 15]. We will discuss the literature in relation to
the case and these two findings.
3.1. Laterality in Emotion Recognition. Researchers have still
not reached consensus on the specific contribution of the
right and left hemisphere to emotion recognition. A recent
review of many studies examining emotion recognition after
stroke found more support for the hypothesis that emotion
recognition seems to be largely lateralized to the right hemi-
sphere, independent of valence [5, 17]. Several studies report
that left hemispheric stroke patients perform as good as hea-
lthy controls in the recognition of emotions [18–21]. However,
other studies do reveal differences in emotion recognition
between patients with a left hemispheric stroke and healthy
controls [22–24]. The left hemispheric stroke of our patient
is in line with these studies and adds to the theory that the
left hemisphere also contributes to the process of emotion
recognition. According to the motoric direction theory, the
left hemisphere is specialized in “approach” emotions (i.e.,
happiness, anger, and surprise), whereas the right hemisphere
is responsible for recognizing “withdrawal” emotions (i.e.,
sadness, fear, and disgust) [25]. The patient had relative
ease in recognizing anger and happiness, although he scored
below the cutoff score for surprise. He scored relatively
low for the withdrawal emotions: fear, sadness, and disgust.
Although the patient does partly fit the pattern of this
hypothesis, the location of the stroke would suggest that
the specialization of both hemispheres is just the opposite
of what the motoric direction theory suggests. Possibly,
disconnectivity between both hemispheres (Figure 2) could
explain this mismatch.
3.2. Neural Correlates of Emotion Recognition. Several brain
structures have been suggested to be involved in emotion
recognition. For example, lesions to left or right temporal
cortex lead to impaired emotion recognition [26]. However,
lesions to the basal ganglia [27, 28], the cerebellum [29],
the thalamus [30], the right inferior parietal cortex, and the
anterior infracalcarine cortex [18] can have the same conse-
quence. It is well known that activity in the amygdala has been
strongly linked to recognition of fear [16], and a lesion of the
amygdala causes an impairment in fear recognition [31–33].
However, this does not imply that lesions of the amygdala are
the unique cause of impaired fear recognition. For example, a
study reported that a lesion to the right infracalcarine cortex
also seems to lead to a specific impairment in the recognition
of fear [18]. This suggests that even the recognition of one
single emotion, in this case the emotion fear, is a process that
involves, like all cognitive functions [34], a network of brain
structures.
A meta-analysis of fMRI and PET studies [16] in healthy
controls concluded that the neural network involved in
recognition of emotion consists of three important structures.
The first is the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), which has a
general role in emotional processing. The other two are the
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and the insula, which are
more specifically involved in emotion recognition, especially
in more cognitive demanding tasks [16].
3.3.The Insula and Emotion Recognition. Because our patient
had a stroke involving, among others, the posterior part of the
left insula, this specific lesionmight have caused the difficulty
in recognition of emotion. In behavioral and imaging studies,
the insula is found to be engaged in the recognition of disgust
[14, 15]. However, less is known about the consequences of a
lesion to the insula. Several case studies describe different res-
ponses to an acute lesion of the left insula. In one study,
a patient had impairments in global cognitive functioning
as reflected by cognitive screening with theMoCA [35], com-
parable with the case we described. In a double case report,
one patient with insular stroke had only slightly slower res-
ponse times but no impaired emotion recognition [36]. The
second case that is described had a subcortical stroke, dis-
connecting the connections from the insula to the fro-
ntal cortex. In this case, an impaired recognition of all neg-
ative emotions was found. Another study reported on a pat-
ient with behavioral changes after an isolated stroke of the
anterior part of the right insula [37]. Although emotion per-
ception was not assessed, an additional SPECT scan showed
hypoperfusion in several right anterior brain structures, most
of which are thought to be involved in an emotion-network.
3.4. A Matter of (Dis)connection? As stated earlier, the left
insula plays a role in a network of structures involved in
emotion recognition. This can be supported by a recent
study in which direct electrical stimulation was applied to
the left insula during awake surgery in thirteen patients
causing a decreased recognition of all negative emotions [39].
Another study found that impaired emotion recognition was
associated with dysfunction of a bilateral fronto-temporal-
limbic network in 180 patients with traumatic brain injury
(TBI) [40]. A different study found that damage anywhere
to the inferior frontooccipital fasciculus or the inferior
longitudinal fasciculus is associated with impaired emotion
recognition [41]. The seemingly contradicting evidence of
different presentations after insular stroke can be better
interpreted as the consequence of disconnection to frontal or
a variety of contralateral regions [42]. This implies that the
process of emotion recognition is not confined to a specific
location, a lesion anywhere in this “emotion-network” may
lead to a deficit in emotion recognition [43].
We hypothesize that in our patient the stroke caused
damage to the network involved in emotion recognition,
which is supported by the analysis of the DTI-MRI data
(Figure 2). Although this analysis does not provide direct
evidence for emotion recognition being a network-function,
it does support this theory by showing disconnection inmore
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brain structures than those directly affected by the stroke.We
propose that the profound impairment of recognition of fear
can be explained by a disconnection of fibers to this emotion-
network.
3.5. Impact of Impaired Emotion Recognition after Stroke.
Impaired emotion recognition has been found to negatively
impact social participation and quality of life after stroke [44].
For deficits in emotion regulation, the same consequences
have been established [45].The patient’s spouse reported that
the patient showed slight irritability and slowness in commu-
nication after the stroke, although the patient himself stated
having no difficulties in social interaction. We hypothesize
that the deficit in emotion recognition could partly contribute
to these symptoms, and this deficit could consequently lead to
restrictions in social participation.
4. Conclusions
Impaired emotion recognition is prevalent after stroke. How-
ever, it is not often reported by the patient or the caregiver, it
is not easily recognized, and it is not routinely investigated in
clinical practice. This is unfortunate, since impaired emotion
recognition negatively impacts social participation. Detec-
tion of impaired emotion recognitionmay help in guidance of
the patient and his caregiver. In turn, this should help people
better reintegrate into daily life and increase quality of life.
Emotion recognition is a complex process involving
many neural structures. A lesion anywhere in this emotion-
network can lead to dysfunction. Further research on emo-
tion recognition should shift its focus from the specific
localization of emotion recognition to identifying the brain
regions and the functional and structural connections that
form part of this emotion-network.
Additional Points
In the Prediction of Cognitive Recovery After Stroke (PRO-
CRAS) study, we aim to investigate the additional value of
measures of structural connectivity derived from diffusion
tensor imaging- (DTI-) MRI in the prediction of cognitive
recovery after stroke. Patients with the clinical diagnosis of a
stroke with a MoCA total score below 26 undergo a neuro-
psychological assessment and DTI-MRI 3–6 weeks after
stroke. One year after stroke the neuropsychological assess-
ment is repeated to assess the primary endpoint.
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